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Hart, Austin, and the Concept of a Legal
System: The Primacy of Sanctions
In 1961, H. L. A. Hart published The Concept of Law, his most
extensive and systematic essay in general jurisprudence.' Hart's book
immediately received widespread critical attention.2 Today, The Con-
cept of Law is generally regarded as an original and important work.
Indeed, this is too cautious a claim: The Concept of Law has become
an established classic. The core of Hart's argument is addressed to
three related questions: What is a legal rule? What are the points of
difference and similarity between law and morality? What is a legal
system?3 This Note is concerned with Hart's answer to the last of these
three questions, with his attempt, in The Concept of Law, to build up
a coherent and satisfying picture of what a municipal 4 legal system is.
In the opening chapter of The Concept of Law, Hart states that the
purpose of his book is "to advance legal theory by providing an im-
proved analysis of the distinctive structure of a municipal legal system
and a better understanding of the resemblances and differences be-
tween law, coercion, and morality as types of social phenomena."'
Whether Hart's "improved analysis" yields anything as precise and
unequivocal as a definition of what a legal system is-indeed, whether
such a definition is possible at all-have been much-disputed questions.,
Hart himself appears to have been somewhat skeptical in this regard.
At one point, he even offers several reasons for believing that "nothing
1. H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961) [hereinafter cited as HART]. His other
books include: CAUSATION IN THE LAW (1959) (with A.M. Honor6); LAW, LIBERTY AND
MORALITY (1962); PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968).
2. For a general review of the more important treatments of the book in the secondary
literature, see note 9 inIra. An especially broad and original critique of Hart's concept of
a legal system is contained in Ronald M. Dworkin's essay, Dworkin, The Model of Rules,
35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14 (1967). Dworkin's principal concern is with Hart's definition of a
legal system as a system of rules delimited by a rule of recognition. Dworkin regards this
definition as inadequate, and attempts to show that any developed legal system contains
decisional criteria ("principles" and "policies") which "are not binding because they are
valid under standards laid down by a master rule but are binding-like the master rule
itself-because they are accepted as binding by the community." Id. at 44. For a critique
of Dworkin's attack upon the view that a legal system can be adequately characterized as
a system of rules, see Note, Understanding the Model of Rules: Toward a Reconciliation
of Dworkin and Positivism, 81 YALE L.J. 912 (1972).
3. Hart himself includes a fourth question: "How ... do law and legal obligation
differ from, and how are they related to, orders backed by threats?" HART 7. His answer
to this question is, however, part of his general discussion of legal rules. See id. at 79-88.
4. Hart uses the term "municipal" in the sense defined in I THE COMPACT EDITION OF
THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 767 (1971): "pertaining to the internal affairs of a state
as distinguished from its foreign relations." Hart's usage has been followed in this Note.
5. HART 17.
6. See note 7 infra.
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concise enough to be recognized as a definition could provide a satis-
factory answer" to the question, "what is law?"7 Nevertheless, despite
his own methodological reservations, Hart does, in fact, attempt to
isolate and specify a set of "central elements"" peculiar to legal systems,
and in this way to distinguish law from those related social phenomena
with which, in his view, it has been wrongly identified.
As a result, The Concept of Law is a deeply ambiguous book. It
appears, at times, that Hart would like to have his cake and eat it too:
to define the concept of a legal system, while protesting that such a
definition must be impossible or uninteresting or both. This approach
has its advantages. In particular, it insulates Hart's concept of a legal
system from critical scrutiny by making any attempt to formulate that
concept with precision and simplicity appear suspect, an unwarranted
bit of dogmatism entirely out of keeping with the mildly skeptical
spirit of Hart's inquiry.
This Note begins with the assumption that Hart makes a serious
effort in The Concept of Law to define the distinguishing features of
a legal system. In order to extract from the book a convincing account
7. HART 16. For Hart's own reasons for believing that such a definition is impossible,
see id. at 13-17. For an extended discussion of the same problem, see Sartorius, Hart's
Concept of Law, in MORE EISAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 131, 142-44, 153-55 (R.S. Summers
ed. 1971). According to Sartorius, the term "law" is an example of what Hilary Putnam
has called a "cluster concept." Cluster concepts are distinguished by the fact that "few,
if any, of the conditions associated with them (i.e., satisfied in the standard or paradigm
cases of their correct application) are individually necessary, and those which are neces-
sary are not jointly sufficient." Id. at 142. It is therefore impossible, on this view, to
frame a list of necessary and sufficient conditions associated with legal systems generally,
that is, to define the concept of a legal system.
The theory of cluster concepts closely parallels Wittgenstein's discussion of "family
resemblances." L. ,VITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 66-67 (3d. ed. 1968). It
is likely that Hart's doubts concerning the possibility of satisfactorily defining the concept
of law or a legal system are due to the pervasive influence which Wittgenstein's own
skepticism about definitions bad upon him. See HART 234.
Even supposing, however, that no list of conditions necessary and sufficient for the
definition of a legal system could be enumerated, a clarification of the resemblances and
differences between law and other forms of social control would still require that the
principal distinguishing features of what Hart calls the "standard case" of a legal system
be marked off and isolated. Id. at 4. If these features cannot be isolated at all (that is, if
the standard case is indistinguishable from the "doubtful cases" associated with it), then it
is fair to conclude that no definition of the concept of a legal system is possible. To the
extent that the standard case of a legal system is distinguishable from other forms of
social control, even if only partially or imperfectly, there can be nothing absurd or ob-
jectionable in the search for a definition of law. Another way of putting this is to say
that the proposition that law is a cluster concept ought not to be construed as a denial
that law can be defined, but rather as a theory about the nature and limits of such a
definition.
The search for a definition of law, or for an adequate account of the nature of law,
is not really something mysterious, though what will bring it to a successful conclusion
may be; it is the search for the distinctive, central, and important features that mark
off a complex and important social phenomenon. The fact of borderline cases and
the fact that there may be no set of properties common and peculiar to law cannot
show that the search is misguided.
Singer, Hart's Concept of Law, 60 J. PHIL. 197, 200 (1963).
8. HART 79.
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of what a legal system is, and thereby do justice to Hart's own efforts,
it is necessary, however, that great importance be attached to an aspect
of his analysis of law that Hart himself regarded as relatively unim-
portant and to which he devoted only a few scattered pages; and con-
versely, that little importance be attached to those arguments in The
Concept of Law that comprise the most extensive, and apparently on
Hart's view most original, part of the book. Obviously, this approach
distorts Hart's own priorities. At the same time, however, it salvages
his claim to have isolated the distinguishing features of a legal system.
It is the thesis of the first part of this Note that Hart's concept of a
legal system turns upon his analysis of the distinctiveness of legal
sanctions, and that Hart's account of the peculiar nature of legal sanc-
tions provides the most convincing basis to be found in The Concept
of Law for distinguishing legal systems from other types of social
phenomena.9
The aim of the second part of the Note is to demonstrate the
similarity between Hart's concept of a legal system and that of his
principal polemical adversary, John Austin. A good part of The Con-
cept of Law is devoted to an attack upon the theory of legal obligation
formulated by Austin in The Province of Jurisprudence Determined.'0
When Hart remarks that the purpose of his book is "to advance legal
9. In the 13 years since The Concept of Law was first published, a number of articles
in philosophical and legal journals have sought to clarify Hart's conception of the dis-
tinctive structure of municipal law. Generally speaking, Hart's commentators have main-
tained that the core of his concept of a legal system is to be located either in his analysis
of rules and rule-governed behavior, see Dworkin, supra note 2, or in his rather extended
discussion of the difference between legal and moral obligation, see Sartorius, supra note 7.
In attempting to explicate his definition of a legal system, many of Hart's commentators
have ignored his theory of legal sanctions. See Dworkin, supra note 2; Hughes, Professor
Hart's Concept of Law, 25 MOD. L. REv. 319 (1962); King, The Basic Concept of Professor
Hart's Jurisprudence: The Norm out of the Bottle, 1963 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 270; Mullock,
Some Comments on Professor Hart's Legal System-A Reply to Professor Summers, 1965
DUKE L.J. 62; Singer, supra note 7; Summers, Professor H.L.A. Hart's Concept of Law,
1963 DUKE L.J. 629; Taylor, H.L.A. Hart's Concept of Law in the Perspective of American
Legal Realism, 35 MOD. L. REv. 606 (1972); Brown, Book Review, 72 PHIL. REv. 250 (1963);
Cohen, Book Review, 71 MIND 395 (1962); Morris, Book Review, 75 HARv. L. REv. 1452
(1962); Noonan, Book Review, 7 NAT'L L.F. 169 (1962); Ross, Book Review, 71 YALE L.J.
1185 (1962). Others have argued that his definition is incomplete because of the absence
of any such theory. See Cameron, Observations on the "Concept of Law", 8 JUR. REy.
(N.s.) 101 (1963); Kanowitz, The Place of Sanctions in Professor H.L.A. Hart's Concept of
Law, 5 DuQ. L. REV. 1 (1966).
If Hart's commentators have failed to appreciate the central position which Hart's
theory of sanctions occupies in his concept of a legal system, they have only been follow-
ing Hart's own lead. At various points in The Concept of Law, Hart himself appears to
assert the view that "law without sanctions is perfectly conceivable." HART 38. Law
without sanctions may very well be conceivable. But whether Hart's concept of a legal
system turns upon a theory of sanctions is an entirely different matter. If it does-and it
is the aim of the first part of this Note to demonstrate that it does-then what we must
conclude is that Hart's belief that law without sanctions is perfectly conceivable is not
justified by his own concept of a legal system.
10. J. AusTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED, ETC. (1954 ed.) [hereinafter
cited as AUSTIN].
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theory by providing an improved analysis of the distinctive structure of
a municipal legal system," what he principally has in mind is an ad-
vance beyond Austin's concept of a legal system. Hart's main criticism
of Austin's concept of a legal system is that it does not include the
idea of a "rule."" Although a plausible argument can be made to the
effect that Austin's concept of a legal system does, in fact, include the
idea of a rule, 12 it cannot be denied that Hart formulates this idea with
a degree of precision unapproached in Austin's writings.
The centrally important element in Hart's concept of a legal system
is not, however, the idea of a rule. The core of Hart's concept of a legal
system, this Note argues, is to be found in his analysis of legal sanctions.
A similar analysis of legal sanctions occupies an equally central posi-
tion in Austin's concept of a legal system. The conclusion to be drawn
is that Hart's concept of a legal system resembles Austin's far more than
has been suspected, and represents far less of an advance beyond Aus-
tin's "analysis of the distinctive structure of a municipal legal system"
than either Hart or his admirers might wish.
I. Hart's Concept of a Legal System
A. The Form and Content of a Legal System
1. Primary and Secondary Rules
Hart's own positive answer to the question, "What is a legal system?",
is built upon his critique of Austin, a critique which occupies three
full chapters in The Concept of Law.13 According to Hart, this ex-
tended treatment is warranted because the mistakes of the Austinian
conception of law are themselves illuminating: they are basic mistakes
which, when correctly understood, point the way toward a more sophis-
ticated and compelling legal theory.
Hart claims that the Austinian definition of law is built up from
"the apparently simple elements of commands and habits,"' 4 the
"ideas of orders, obedience, habits, and threats."' 5 According to Hart,
Austin's definition is inadequate because it does not include the "idea
of a rule,"' 0 that is, the idea of a standard which functions as a "reason
11. See pp. 587-88 infra.
12. See p. 602 infra.
13. HART 18-76.
14. Id. at 18.
15. Id. at 78.
16. Id.
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or justification"17 for doing or not doing certain things. The "critical
reflective attitude"' s or "internal aspect"' 9 which distinguishes the
"normative structure of society" 20 presupposes the existence of rules
and their use as standards for the evaluation and justification of social
conduct. Consequently, the idea of a rule is required to explain any
structure of authority2' or obligation, 22 since part of the meaning of
either is that those participating in such a structure not only do certain
things, but seek to justify what they do as well. And, because both
authority and obligation are features of every legal system, without the
idea of a rule "we cannot hope to elucidate even the most elementary
forms of law."
2 3
According to Hart, then, a legal system must be a system of rules.
But taken by itself, the general property of being rule-governed is not
enough to distinguish a legal system from any other social institution
which employs principles or standards of justification. Moral systems,
social customs, and games are examples-Hart's own, in fact-of systems
of conduct, ordered in accordance with rules, which are not themselves
legal systems.2 4 Hart himself recognizes that the distinctive structure
of a legal system cannot consist in its being simply a system of rules.
Accordingly, in order to account for the distinguishing features of a
legal system, Hart introduces a number of additional elements into his
analysis. The first addition is the assertion that law is a union of two
distinct types of rules, which Hart terms "primary" and "secondary."2
"Rules of the first type concern actions involving physical movement or
changes."'2 6 Rules of the second type specify how rules of the first type
are to be created, amended, abolished, interpreted, and applied. Thus
while primary rules regulate behavior, secondary rules regulate or in-
form other rules. The two types of rules operate upon logically distinct
subject matters. Consequently, the conceptual assimilation of one to
the other is impossible. Hart makes what is for him the unusually
sweeping assertion that "in the combination of these two types of rules
lies what Austin wrongly claimed to have found in the notion of
coercive orders, namely, 'the key to the science of jurisprudence.' ",27
17. Id. at 82.
18. Id. at 56.
19. Id. at 55.
20. Id. at 86.
21. Id. at 57.
22. Id. at 79-88.
23. Id. at 78.
24. Id. at 55-56, 165.
25. Id. at 78.
26. Id. at 79.
27. Id.
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But like the general proposition that law is a system of rules, the
more specific claim that law is a union of primary and secondary rules
fails to define the distinctive structure of a legal system. Many institu-
tions which are not themselves legal systems exhibit this same union of
primary and secondary rules. An example, which has already been
exploited by another philosopher to make this point,28 is the National
Football League. Some of the rules which are observed by the players
and officials of the League specify how the game of football is to be
played (for example, how points are scored, when the game begins and
ends, what constitutes a personal foul and how it is penalized). These
rules fit Hart's description of primary rules. But the League also has
rules which specify how the rules of play may be changed and who has
the authority to interpret and apply ambiguous rules, such as the rule
prohibiting "intentional" grounding of the ball. These rules can only
be described as "secondary" rules in Hart's sense.
It seems fair to conclude that any practice or institution which orders
human conduct by means of rules, and which is complicated or im-
portant enough to require a regular procedure for determining how
these rules are to be made, modified, interpreted, or applied, will con-
sist of a union of primary and secondary rules. Such a union is not
peculiar to legal systems, and therefore cannot serve as the touchstone
for distinguishing legal from other forms of social control. If Hart's
concept of law went only this far, it would not be a concept of law
at all.
2. The Minimum Content of Natural Law
It is Hart's contention that every legal system is a union of primary
and secondary rules. But in addition to this merely formal property,
Hart claims that all legal systems also share a certain minimum content,
which he calls the "minimum content of Natural Law."1
29
According to Hart, the truth of this claim rests upon the observation
that "most men most of the time wish to continue in existence"30 or
survive. In "the modest aim of survival" Hart locates "the central in-
disputable element which gives empirical good sense to the terminol-
ogy of Natural Law."31 Of course, this view represents only a "very
attenuated version" 32 of the classical Natural Law doctrine which
sought, above all else, to distinguish those lives which were good and
28. See Sartorius, supra note 7, at 139. Undoubtedly, the World Football League would
be an equally appropriate example.
29. HART 189.
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desirable from those which were not.33 Hart claims, however, that this
attenuated version of Natural Law possesses great strength since its
obvious truth "can be disentangled from more disputable parts of the
general teleological outlook in which the end or good for man appears
as a specific way of life about which, in fact, men may profoundly
disagree. 3
4
Given a few universal-but nevertheless contingent-facts about
human nature and the world in general,33 such as human vulnerability
to bodily attack, approximate equality in physical size and strength,
and the relative scarcity of natural resources, it follows that "there are
certain rules of conduct which any social organization must contain if
it is to be viable,"3 6 that is, if it is to secure the basic human aim of
survival. Thus, if a social organization is to avoid becoming a "suicide
club,"3 7 it must restrict the free use of violence among its members,38
provide for a "system of mutual forbearance and compromise,"39
establish a cooperative division of labor 40 and so on. Hart enumerates
a series of such rules of conduct which, taken together, form the
necessary "minimum content of Natural Law" that any moral or legal
practice must contain if it is to endure.
Hart most often speaks of this "minimum content" as if it were a
distinguishing feature of moral and legal systems in particular. In fact,
this "common element" of Natural Law is really a precondition for the
continued existence of any social organization whatsoever, or for the
association of men in general. Absent this "common element," social
life in its entirety-and not merely in its legal and moral aspects-
would disappear. Consequently, although Hart's analysis of the "min-
imum content of Natural Law" is unimpeachable (since, as Hart ad-
mits, the propositions on which it rests are truisms), 41 it nevertheless
fails to bring us any closer to an understanding of the specific and
distinguishing structure of a legal system.
B. Hart's Analysis of the Distinction between Law and Morality
Even if we assume that moral and legal systems are the only ones
which contain what Hart calls the "minimum content of Natural Law,"
33. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS * 1095a (13)-1096a(10), 1097a(15)-1099b(1O).
34. HART 187.
35. "Contingent" because Hart assumes these facts to be empirically uniform and
invariable, but not logically necessary.
36. Id. at 188.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 190.
39. Id. at 191.
40. Id. at 192.
41. Id. at 189.
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an adequate account of what a legal system is would still have to include
grounds for distinguishing law from morality. A good part of The
Concept of Law is devoted to just this problem.
According to Hart, there are "four cardinal related features which
collectively serve to distinguish morality not only from legal rules but
from other forms of social rule" 42 as well. Hart's detailed discussion of
these four features represents the core of his attempt to elucidate the
distinctive structure of a legal system. Consequently, each of the four
features which Hart isolates deserves critical scrutiny. The arguments
which follow are designed to show that, in fact, only one of these four
features distinguishes law from morality in a principled and thorough-
going way, and that this feature therefore is the best test which Hart
offers for distinguishing law from other forms of social control.
1. The Nondeliberate Character of Moral Change
The first criterion that Hart offers for distinguishing morality from
law is that while "new legal rules can be introduced and old ones
changed or repealed by deliberate enactment.., by contrast moral
rules or principles cannot be brought into being or changed or elimi-
nated in this way." 43 But it is not hard to conceive of a moral system
that falls on the wrong side of the line this test would draw.44
We can imagine, without much difficulty, a community of individ-
uals bound together by a set of rules which define their moral obliga-
tions to one another, as well as to those outside of the community, which
is nevertheless not itself a legal system. A religious sect existing within
the territorial jurisdiction of a secular state is one example of such a
community. If we refine our imaginary picture by assuming, in ad-
dition, that the members of this community all believe that the ethical
pronouncements of one particular member are morally binding upon
the others, we do not necessarily transform our imaginary community
into a legal system. It is perfectly conceivable that such a moral legis-
lator is regarded by the other members of his community as a prophet
who is peculiarly qualified to lay down rules of moral conduct for
42. Id. at 169.
43. Id. at 171.
44. In order to test the validity of this distinction, it is necessary to conduct a thought
experiment. Can we imagine a system of moral conduct whose rules can be "brought into
being or changed or eliminated" deliberately? It should be noted that this experiment
requires that we already have a set of intuitions about what is, and what is not, a system
of moral conduct. There is nothing objectionable in this. Hart's own account of the
differences between law and morality rests upon a similar presupposition. The real ques-
tion is whether Hart's account fits our intuitions, or is at variance with them. This ap-
proach accords with the idea of "reflective equilibrium" formulated by J. RAwLs, A
THEORY OF JusTicE 48-51 (1971).
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the community as a whole. If so, he may very well possess the authority
to make and unmake the community's morality, by proclamation.
Empirical examples of such a community may be found in those
systems of morality that have grown up on the basis of charismatic
proclamation. 45 Typically, the rules of life conduct laid down by a
charismatic prophet mark a sudden and complete break with prevailing
norms. Such systems are distinguished from traditional and established
patterns of ethical conduct by the very deliberateness with which their
guiding principles have been formulated.
The basic error underlying Hart's contention that moral rules cannot
be deliberately enacted or changed is his mistaken belief that all moral
rules are like traditions.46 This view of morality is unjustifiably narrow.
The purpose of the example we have just offered was to show that,
contrary to what Hart contends, there is nothing absurd in the idea
that standards can be "endowed with, or deprived of, moral status by
human fiat."
47
Of course, it might be objected that the example proves Hart's point,
since in our imaginary community the belief of the members that they
are morally obliged to observe their leader's proclamations does not
itself rest upon a rule which has been, or could be deliberately laid
down. This objection proves too much, however; on Hart's view (a
view explored in the next section), the authority of those who are re-
sponsible for enacting and modifying the laws of a legal system also
rests upon a practice of acceptance which cannot be deliberately
enacted.
Deliberate enactment is not a property or characteristic which neces-
sarily distinguishes law from morality.
2. The Necessary Importance of Moral Rules
Hart's second ground for distinguishing morality from law rests on
the proposition that "importance is not essential to the status of all
legal rules as it is to that of morals." 48 By this Hart means that while a
law that is "generally thought quite unimportant to maintain" re-
45. See 1 M. WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 241-54 (G. Roth & C. Wittich eds. 1968); 3
id. at 1111-56. See generally N. COHN, THE PURSUIT OF THE MILLENNIUNI (1961).
Of course, the prophet claims that his prophecy is legitimate and therefore binding
upon the members of his community because he is God's authorized spokesman. But in
this regard, he is in the same situation as a lawmaker who asserts that the laws he has
made are legitimate not merely because he has made them, but because he has made them
in accordance with, and on the basis of, the authority which has been constitutionally
delegated to him (whether the constitution be written or not).
46. HART 172.
47. Id. at 171.
48. Id. at 170.
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mains a legal rule until repealed, by contrast, it would "be absurd to
think of a rule as part of the morality of a society even though no one
thought it any longer important or worth maintaining."
49
The force of this argument derives from Hart's distinction between
acceptance and validity. According to Hart, all of the rules of a legal
system except one, the rule of recognition, belong to that system by
virtue of their legal validity. They are part of the legal system regard-
less of whether they are observed or enforced, because they derive from
or pass "all the tests" 0 contained in the rule of recognition. That rule
itself is neither valid nor invalid, for while it is the criterion in ac-
cordance with which the validity or invalidity of all the other rules of
the legal system is determined, "there is no rule providing criteria for
the assessment of its own legal validity."'51 The rule of recognition is in-
cluded in the legal system, but its inclusion rests upon a different
ground: upon the fact that it is "simply accepted as appropriate for
use. ' 2 Thus, for Hart, any rule-other than the rule of recognition-
may be part of a legal system, may exist as a legal rule, despite the fact
that it is not accepted (i.e., observed or enforced) as long as it passes
the tests of legal validity stipulated by the rule of recognition itself.
Hart's argument that importance is a necessary feature of all moral
rules amounts to the contention that the distinction between accept-
ance and validity has no application to moral systems, i.e., that a rule or
principle can be part of a moral system only if it is "accepted as ap-
propriate for use."
This view is a mistaken one. There is no absurdity in thinking that
a particular moral rule belongs to a system of such rules despite the
fact that it is neither observed nor enforced. A rule may belong to a
system of moral rules if it meets the criteria of validity specified by
that system's rule of recognition, and despite its nonacceptance in
practice.
Obviously, what this view depends upon is the assumption that a
moral system may be complex enough to contain rules of two sorts-
those which belong to the system merely because they are accepted as
"appropriate for use," and those which belong because they satisfy all
of the tests laid out in some master rule, or rule of recognition-without
thereby automatically becoming a legal system. That this assumption
is justified may be seen by considering the following example.
49. Id. at 170-71.
50. Id. at 100.
51. Id. at 104.
52. Id. at 105.
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Imagine a church with many members and a long history which has
never been, at any time, a legal system. Because the church imposes
many different moral obligations on its members, it happens from time
to time that these obligations come into conflict with one another, one
commanding what the other prohibits. In order to resolve such con-
flicts, a council is established to review any serious inconsistencies that
may arise because of competing moral obligations, and to declare
which obligation the members of the church are to recognize. Let us
assume that long ago this council decided that the moral well-being of
the members would be advanced by requiring that each member make
a regular confession of his or her moral failings to a local representative
of the council itself. And let us further assume that the council
recorded this decision in a special book which it keeps to insure that
its decisions are consistent.
Suppose that after a period of time, the members of the church
cease to make regular confession as the council had required, and that
the local representatives of the council, who are far too busy with other
matters, no longer insist that they do so. The rule that all church
members are to make regular confession ceases either to be obeyed or
enforced. Can we say that the rule continues to be part of the system
of moral rules recognized by the members of the church?
However we decide this question, a conclusion that the rule requir-
ing confession is part of the moral system of the church would be no
more absurd than the conclusion that a minor traffic regulation which
is neither obeyed nor enforced belongs properly to a particular legal
system. Both conclusions would make sense (or nonsense) for the same
reason.
What we would want to say about one rule could equally well be
said about the other: It is a valid rule, despite the fact that it is not
"accepted as appropriate for use." In either case, the claim that the
rule belongs to a system of rules merely means that the rule was
promulgated in accordance with a procedure that is recognized as
authoritative.
Hart limits his analysis to moral systems of a very primitive sort,
i.e., to those which are composed exclusively of primary rules. In such
systems, questions concerning the validity of any particular rule are
not likely to be distinguished from questions concerning its acceptance.
With this focus, Hart ignores the possibility that a moral rule might
remain the rule of a particular moral community, especially a complex
moral community like a church, even though it is no longer thought
"important or worth maintaining."
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3. Moral and Legal Responsibility
The third basis which Hart offers for distinguishing law from moral-
ity is that
legal responsibility is not necessarily excluded by the demonstra-
tion that an accused person could not have kept the law which he
has broken; by contrast, in morals 'I could not help it' is always
an excuse, and moral obligation would be altogether different
from what it is if the moral 'ought' did not in this sense imply
'can'.53
Put simply, Hart's claim is that while a legal system may "for cer-
tain types of offence, impose 'strict liability' and make responsibility
independent of mens rea altogether, except perhaps for the minimum
requirement that the accused must possess normal muscular control,
' 5 4
strict liability in morality is unthinkable. This claim is a plausible one.
Its apparent force derives, however, from Hart's equivocal and mis-
leading use of the concept of legal responsibility.
If we think of an individual's legal responsibilities as including all
and only those things which the law requires him to do or to refrain
from doing, it follows that the legal "ought" implies "can" to the
same extent (and for the same reasons) that the moral "ought" does.
Hart acknowledges that this is true of the majority of responsibilities
which a legal system imposes; he denies, however, that it is true of
those "types of offense" which rest upon a strict liability. What Hart
fails to appreciate is that even these "types of offense," if they may be
said to impose responsibilities in the sense defined above, rest upon
an underlying "can" and have an exact moral analogue.
Rules of strict liability which impose upon the liable party a re-
sponsibility to act in a certain way are of the following form: When
event X happens, person A must do something (make compensation to
another person B, pay a fine to the state, etc.), despite the fact that the
happening of event X was in no way subject to the control of person
A.rr It is of course true that A cannot excuse himself from the duty
53. Id. at 174.
54. Id.
55. It should be emphasized that laws holding individuals responsible for actions
which they could not possibly prevent occupy but a small place in any modern legal
system.o Many laws which might appear, at first glance, to impose such a strict liability
rest in fact upon a presumption that it is within the power of the liable party to control
or prevent the action in question. This is true, for example, of those laws which hold an
employer responsible for the tortious conduct of his employee, so long as the employee's
conduct remains within the scope of his employment. It is no objection that here the
presumption of control is often a mere fiction; for the fact that the fiction is required in
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imposed by the rule on the grounds that the happening of X was not
within his control: if he could, the liability imposed by the rule would
not be strict. But what if A seeks to excuse himself on the grounds that
he is unable to perform the duty which the rule imposes (if he says, for
example, that he has no money with which to compensate B)? An as-
sumption is built into the rule that A is capable of performing the
duty which the rule imposes, even if he was utterly unable to prevent
the happening of X. The rule tells A that he must do something if X
happens; it is not a prediction that he will in fact do it. This much
follows from Hart's own analysis of rules. 56 And to the extent that the
rule commands A to do something, to the extent that it imposes an
obligation on A at all, it presupposes that what is required of A is
within his power to perform.
Of course, this presupposition may not always accord with the facts.
If A is penniless, he is (at least temporarily) unable to compensate B.
Furthermore, A's poverty may be a mitigating factor, which provokes
judicial leniency or even forgiveness (and this will depend, perhaps, on
whether A was robbed of all his money- a loss beyond A's control-or
foolishly gambled it away-a loss regarded as within his control). The
important point is that the presupposition remains; A's inability to
compensate B is not an excuse which merely has to be asserted in order
that A be released from his obligation to do so.
When strict legal liability is dissected in this way, it becomes clear
that it has a moral analogue. In a great many instances, we acquire
moral obligations as a result of the happening of some event utterly
beyond our control. Thus, a citizen of a particular state may have a
positive moral obligation to help eradicate an institution which existed
long before he was born and which he had no part in making: racism
in America would be an example. An individual may have a moral
obligation to develop his talents, and be held blameworthy for not
doing so, despite the fact that he acquired his talents, at least in part,
through an accident of birth.
What if someone says, however, that he should not be blamed for
failing to develop his talents? Here, of course, everything turns upon
the excuse which he offers to explain his failure. If he says he should
not be blamed because he is an essentially weak person who lacks the
necessary discipline, he has failed to give an adequate excuse since it
order to justify the law dramatizes the difficulty we have in imposing a legal "ought"
without presupposing an underlying "can." In the example used here, a rule of perfectly
strict liability is postulated in order that Hart's argument be presented in its strongest
form.
56. Id. at 87-88.
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is precisely such discipline which the moral rule commands him to
develop. A weak man who squanders his talents may evoke pity and
solicitude; he is nevertheless a moral failure. We hold him to blame
for his conduct because, in the last analysis, his weakness is his own
fault.
If, however, someone is struck by a crippling disease, it would be
unfair not to readjust or temper (but perhaps not dismiss entirely) our
belief that he has a moral duty to develop his talents. In this respect,
moral and judicial forgiveness are much alike. Once again, the im-
portant point is that moral responsibility-like its legal counterpart-
is not automatically dissipated by the magic formula, "I could not help
it."
In both law and morality, obligations may be conditioned on events
beyond the control of the individual upon whom the obligation is
imposed. And, in both law and morality, the imposition of any obliga-
tion necessarily presupposes that the obligation can be satisfied, al-
though, in both law and morality, this presupposition may be over-
ridden in particular cases. While the event which triggers a moral or
legal obligation may be defined as being beyond one's control, the
action which the obligation prescribes or prohibits cannot be. This
fact, far from marking a distinction between law and morality, points
to one of their deepest affinities.
There is, however, one situation in which Hart's distinction makes
sense. Consider the following example. A is arrested for the possession
of a dangerous drug (a crime, in A's country, let us assume, with no
scienter requirement whatsoever). The drug was mailed to A without
his knowledge, and wrapped in a package whose contents A could not
discern. A is arrested at the post office, after picking up the package
but before he has had a chance to open it. He is tried and convicted
of the crime of possession and sentenced to a term in prison. Although
A has broken a rule of law, there is no sense in which he can be said
to have violated a rule of morality.
Although this example illustrates an important difference between
law and morality, the difference cannot be expressed in terms of the
concept of responsibility, at least not in terms of the concept as it was
defined above. It is true that A has broken a rule of law; the rule which
he has broken, however, did not require him to do or refrain from
doing anything. The rule does not include an "ought" directed to A
at all. The rule merely says that something will be done to A upon the
happening of an event which might well be beyond A's control, that A
will be punished or sanctioned for the possession of a dangerous drug
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despite his own ignorance regarding the fact of possession. If what
Hart is claiming is that a legal sanction may be imposed in such a case,
but that a moral sanction cannot be, then his claim has a significant
element of truth. But this distinction does not turn upon some dif-
ference between legal and moral responsibility; or if one wants to
insist that it does, the concept of responsibility must be redefined in
terms of the concept of a sanction. Our legal responsibilities include
all and only those acts whose commission or omission may be made the
occasion for the application of a legal sanction. On this view, the
peculiar character of legal responsibility would appear to be dependent
upon the peculiar character of legal sanctions.
In fact, the fourth and last reason which Hart gives for distinguishing
law from morality is that they employ different types of sanctions.
Hart's account of the distinctiveness of legal sanctions provides his
most compelling answer to the question, "what is a legal system?"
4. Moral and Legal Sanctions
According to Hart, "rules are conceived and spoken of as imposing
obligations when the general demand for conformity is insistent and
the social pressure brought to bear upon those who deviate or threaten
to deviate is great." 57 An insistent and serious social pressure of this
sort is characteristic of legal and moral systems alike and serves, in a
rough and ready way, to distinguish both of them from those systems
of conduct which attach only a limited importance to the breach of
their rules.
While it is true that the observance of both legal and moral rules is
treated as a serious matter, the forms of pressure brought to bear in
their enforcement are typically quite different. According to Hart,
legal rules are primarily enforced through the threat and actual use
of "physical sanctions"; 58 by contrast, the typical form of moral pres-
sure "consists in appeals to the respect for the rules, as things important
in themselves, which is presumed to be shared by those addressed."5 9
Although this point is an important and illuminating one, Hart puts
it in a somewhat misleading way. In the first place, those appeals to
conscience which Hart associates with the enforcement of morals also
play an important role in the enforcement of the rules of a legal sys-
tem. This is especially true with respect to self-enforcement, where
obedience to the law is often based upon the belief that one has a
57. Id. at 84.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 175.
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moral obligation to do as the law commands. That the appeal here is
to a moral belief, or to one's conscience, does not alter the underlying
fact that in this situation the appeal operates as an instrument of law
enforcement. More importantly, there is nothing absurd in the idea
of a moral system which stipulates that certain classes of wrongdoers
ought to be punished by the application of physical sanctions. The
fact that the use of such sanctions for a moral purpose may itself be a
legal offense does not invalidate this point.
If this is so, what can Hart mean when he asserts that laws are
typically enforced by the use (or threatened use) of physical sanctions,
whereas moral rules characteristically rely, for their enforcement, upon
"appeals to conscience" and "the operation of guilt and remorse"? 60
The best way to make sense of this assertion is to treat it as equivalent
to the following proposition: where the rules of a particular system of
conduct are enforced by the application of physical sanctions, that sys-
tem will be a legal system insofar as, and to the extent that, with respect
to the conduct it regulates no other or independent set of rules is ef-
fectively enforced in a similar manner. Or, put negatively, a particular
set of rules is not a legal system if it is unable to punish breaches with
physical sanctions. Thus, while a moral system may prescribe physical
punishment for those who break its rules, so long as the imposition of
such punishment is effectively prohibited by the officials responsible
for enforcing an independent system of rules (through the use of
physical sanctions if necessary) it will remain a moral system. It is just
at the point where this disability is overcome that it is no longer correct
to speak of the rules in question as moral rules, for to the extent that
such rules are effectively enforced by physical sanctions they are laws.
This distinction points to a defining feature of any legal system:
namely, that its existence depends upon and extends only so far as the
system's success in establishing a monopoly over the physical sanctions
available for enforcement purposes, i.e., a monopoly of the available
means of violence. 61 Since what is required here is a monopoly, as a
matter of principle only one set of rules can possess it (within a de-
limited territory or sphere of conduct) at a time. Consequently, it is
60. Id. at 175-76.
61. This formulation is not Hart's own, although he does coquette with such expres-
sions as "official monopoly of 'sanctions,'" id. at 91, and "centralized official 'sanctions,'"
id. at 95. Rather, it is a variation of Weber's definition of the modern state as "a human
community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force
within a given territory." M. WEBER, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER 78 (H.
Gerth 9: C.W. Mills eds. 1958). See generally 1 M. WEBER, supra note 45, at 56. Weber's
formulation has been borrowed because it captures, in an especially succinct fashion, the
gist of Hart's distinction between legal and moral sanctions.
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this feature of law which uniquely distinguishes it from all other forms
of social control.
This may be seen by considering the following example. Imagine a
society based upon an organized system of rules which are enforced by
physical sanctions. Now suppose that there exists within this society a
religious sect with a distinct set of rules governing certain aspects of
the conduct of its members. If this sect seeks to enforce its rules through
the use of physical sanctions, several things may happen: (1) The larger
society may authorize 2 the sect to use such sanctions, in which case
the sect becomes an organ of the legal system; (2) the sect may be
prohibited from using physical sanctions and acquiesce, in which case
it remains a moral order; or (3) it may be prohibited from using
physical sanctions and resist, in which case its resistance will either be
successful and the sect will establish itself as an independent legal
system, or it will be unsuccessful and the sect will be painfully re-
minded of its merely moral status. In any case, the conduct in question
can be regulated by only one legal system at a time. Where different
systems of rules compete for legal status, the outcome will be decided
in favor of that system which acquires an effective monopoly over the
available physical sanctions. Hart's contention that the typical form of
legal pressure consists in "threats of physical punishment" may be
seen as a hesitant and disguised way of stating the same point.
If law differs from morality with respect to the type of sanctions
which it employs, it also differs, according to Hart, with respect to the
mode of their administration. Typically, moral sanctions take the
"form of a general diffused hostile or critical reaction. '6 3 By contrast,
legal sanctions are typically administered by a centralized official
organ 4 which possesses the exclusive authority to punish violations of
the law.
Thus, when an individual breaches a moral duty any other member
of the moral community to which he belongs may impose the appro-
priate sanction (by an appeal to the wrongdoer's conscience, by evoking
feelings of guilt, and so on). The right, or in some cases obligation, to
62. Of course, the larger society may simply ignore the sect's use of physical sanctions.
In this case, the sect's status will remain ambiguous. So long as the larger society is able
to prevent the sect from using physical sanctions, it is proper to speak of the sect as being
authorized (perhaps tacitly) to use such sanctions; when the larger society is no longer
able to prevent the sect from using physical sanctions, even though it continues to claim
that the sect is merely one of its organs, the sect will in reality have acquired the status
of a legal system. So long as the larger society ignores the sect's use of sanctions, its ability
to prevent the sect from using them must remain in doubt. This doubt is removed only
when the two orders are brought into actual conflict.
63. HART 84.
64. Id. at 95.
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impose such a sanction is not limited to a determinate segment of the
moral community; if it exists at all, it may be exercised by any member
of the community, acting as the community's representative. It is not
the case, however, that when a rule of law is broken, every member of
the legal community is equally qualified to inflict an appropriate
punishment upon the wrongdoer. The right and ability to impose legal
sanctions rests exclusively with a determinate class of officials, who
are alone empowered to act in the name of the legal system. The reason
for restricting the administration of legal sanctions in this way is ob-
vious: Since legal sanctions always potentially65 involve physical vio-
lence, their free use must be curtailed if an organized and ongoing
social life is to be possible at all. Thus, the mode of administration
characteristic of legal sanctions is a consequence of the distinctive form
that such sanctions typically assume. Legal sanctions must be officially
administered because they are often actually and always potentially
physical in nature.
5. Summary
Hart's definition of a legal system may be summarized in the follow-
ing way: A legal system is a union of primary and secondary rules,
embodying a "minimum content of Natural Law," and enforced by a
determinate class of officials possessing an effective monopoly over the
available physical sanctions within a delimited territory or sphere of
conduct. Although Hart never states this definition in such an explicit
and unequivocal fashion, it constitutes-to borrow Hart's own phrase-
the "core of good sense"6 in his analysis of the distinctive structure of
municipal law. Since only one system of rules can successfully claim
such a monopoly at any given time and with respect to any particular
portion of human conduct, it follows that this definition uniquely
distinguishes legal systems from all other forms of social control. Other
definitions which may be extracted from The Concept of Law fail to
do this, and must be rejected as inadequate. The pivotal center of
Hart's concept of a legal system is to be found not in his analysis of
rules, or in his discussion of the "minimum content of Natural Law,"
or even in the first three arguments which he gives for distinguishing
law from morality, but in his discussion, limited as it may be, of the
distinctiveness of legal sanctions.
65. It is important to keep in mind that on the view being urged here, it is not
necessary that every legal infraction actually be punished by the application of a physical
sanction; it is sufficient that those responsible for administering the law have monop-
olized the capacity for imposing such sanctions.
66. Id. at 194.
HeinOnline -- 84 Yale L.J. 601 1974-1975
The Yale Law Journal
II. Austin's Concept of a Legal System
According to John Austin, it is the "principal purpose" of his main
work in the philosophy of law "to describe the boundary which severs
the province of jurisprudence from the regions lying on its confines,"0 7
and to define "the appropriate matter" 68 with which the science of
law is concerned. In the course of his six lectures on jurisprudence,
Austin attempts to distinguish "laws which are simply and strictly so
called and which form the appropriate matter of general and particular
jurisprudence" from divine law, positive morality, and all laws "merely
metaphorical or figurative."69
"The matter of jurisprudence," on Austin's view, "is positive law:
law, simply and strictly so called: or law set by political superiors to
political inferiors." 70 Law "strictly and simply so called" is, however,
only one species of the wider and more inclusive category of law in
general, which also includes positive morality and divine law. Austin
defines the general concept of law in the following way: "a law, in the
most general and comprehensive acceptation in which the term, in its
literal meaning, is employed, may be said to be a rule laid down for
the guidance of an intelligent being by an intelligent being having
power over him."71
It is important to notice, first, that Austin's definition not only speaks
of a "rule," but it includes, as part of the concept of law in general,
an idea of "reason" or "intelligence" not unlike the notion of a
"critical reflective attitude" which Hart employs to distinguish rule-
governed behavior from habit.72 When intelligence is missing, accord-
ing to Austin, we can speak of law only in a "metaphorical or figura-
tive" sense.
Such is the case when we talk of laws observed by the lower an-
imals; of laws regulating the growth and decay of vegetables; of
laws determining the movements of inanimate bodies or masses.
For where intelligence is not, or where it is too bounded to take
the name of reason and therefore is too bounded to conceive the
purpose of a law, there is not the will which law can work on, or
which duty can incite or restrain. 73
An individual is not following a law (in the strict sense) when he
merely acts in a regular and predictable manner; it is only when such
67. AusTIN, supra note 10, at 2.
68. Id. at 3.
69. Id. at 1.
70. Id. at 9.
71. Id. at 10.
72. HART 56.
73. AusrIN, supra note 10, at 12-13.
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action is purposeful (i.e., is based upon the conception of a purpose)
that it may be described as lawful "in the literal acceptation of the
term." 7
4
In the second place, "laws or rules, properly so called, are a species
of commands... .-75 A command is an order laid down "for the guid-
ance of an intelligent being" by another intelligent being superior to
him, and "distinguished from other significations of desire, not by the
style in which the desire is signified, but by the power and the purpose
of the party commanding to inflict an evil or pain in the case the
desire be disregarded." 76 According to Austin, "the term superiority
signifies might: the power of affecting others with evil or pain, and of
forcing them, through fear of that evil, to fashion their conduct to
one's wishes."
77
"Laws properly so called" cannot be defined, however, simply as
rules laid down by one intelligent being for the guidance of another
intelligent being inferior to him, since this definition applies with
equal validity to divine law and positive morality. Divine laws are
laid down by an intelligent being who is "emphatically the superior
of Man,"78 and whose power over man is "unbounded and resist-
less." 79 Positive moral rules, as Austin views them, are "imperative
laws or rules set by men to men,"80 and backed by "moral sanctions." 8'
In order to determine the "province of jurisprudence" it is there-
fore necessary to distinguish positive law both from divine law and
positive morality. According to Austin, divine laws are "laws set by
God to his human creatures."8 2 The duties imposed by such laws "may
be called religious duties" and their violations "are styled sins."8' 3 By
contrast, the rules of positive law are "set by men to men,"8 4 that is,
they are established and enforced by human beings.
Although this difference in authorship distinguishes divine from
positive law, it does not distinguish positive law from positive morality,
since the rules of positive morality are also, on Austin's view, "set by
men to men." "Laws set by men to men are of two leading or principal
classes" which "should be severed precisely, and opposed distinctly and
conspicuously."85s On the one hand,
74. Id. at 12.
75. Id. at 13.
76. Id. at 14.
77. Id. at 24.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 135.
81. Id. at 157.
82. Id. at 34.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 10-11.
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of the laws set by men to men, some are established by political
superiors, sovereign and subject: by persons exercising supreme
and subordinate government, in independent nations, or independ-
ent political societies. The aggregate of the rules thus established,
or some aggegate forming a portion of that aggregate, is the ap-
propriate matter of jurisprudence general or particular."0
On the other hand,
though some of the laws or rules, which are set by men to men,
are established by political superiors, others are not established by
political superiors, or are not established by political superiors, in
that capacity or character.8 7
Rules of the latter sort belong to positive morality. "Laws properly so
called," in contradistinction to the rules of positive morality, are laid
down for the guidance of men by their political superiors. From this
it follows, according to Austin, that rules of positive law "are clothed
with legal sanction,"88 whereas rules of positive morality are not.
According to Austin,
the superiority which is styled sovereignty, and the independent
political society which sovereignty implies, is distinguished from
other superiority and from other society, by the following marks
or characters: 1. The bulk of the given society are in a habit of
obedience or submission to a determinate and common superior:
let that common superior be a certain individual person, or a
certain body or aggregate of individual persons. 2. That certain
individual, or that certain body of individuals, is not in a habit
of obedience to a determinate human superior.8 9
On its face this definition is a puzzling one since it does not dis-
tinguish political society in any special respect. We can easily imagine
a moral institution-for example, a church-which exhibits both of the
features that Austin treats as the distinguishing marks of an independ-
ent political society. In order to appreciate its full meaning, it is neces-
sary to set Austin's definition of political sovereignty in its proper
context, and explicate his notion of "a habit of obedience to a deter-
minate and common superior."
Generally speaking, it is Austin's view that one individual is bound
86. Id. at 11.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 136.
89. Id. at 193-94.
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or obliged to obey the command of another if the party commanding
has the "power and the purpose" to "inflict an evil or a pain" 0 in case
his command is disobeyed. Consequently, one may be said to be in a
"habit of obedience" to another when the power of that other to "in-
flict an evil or a pain" in case of disobedience is not merely occasional
or temporary, but is "frequent or lasting."' Where only one deter-
minate person or group of persons possesses such "frequent and lasting"
power over others, the "mutual relation" which subsists between them
"may be styled the relation of sovereign and subject, or the relation of
sovereignty and subjection."92
Unfortunately, Austin does not explicitly define the essential nature
of sovereign power more specifically than this. As a result, the distinc-
tion which he wishes to draw between legal and moral power remains
unclear. Austin's general definition of sovereignty fits both equally
well. It is possible, however, to extract a more precise definition of
legal power from an example which Austin employs to illustrate his
conception of sovereignty, the example of "intestine war."
03
According to Austin, a society torn by civil strife may be "in one of
... two positions. ' 9 4 "'If the bulk of each of the [warring] parties be in
a habit of obedience to its head, the given society is broken into two
or more societies, which, perhaps, may be styled independent political
societies.-If the bulk of each of the parties be not in that habit of
obedience, the given society is simply or absolutely in a state of nature
or anarchy."' 5 This passage is most easily read as standing for the pro-
position that an independent political society exists only insofar as and
to the extent that its head is able to impose physical sanctions upon
those who disobey his commands, and that furthermore the power to
impose such sanctions presupposes an effective monopoly of the means
of violence within a particular jurisdiction (defined either with respect
to persons or territory).00
90. Id. at 14.
91. Id. at 206.
92. Id. at 194.
93. Id. at 198.
94. Id. at 198.
95. Id.
96. This interpretation is supported by Austin's brief discussion of the legality of
revolutionary governments. In considering the Mexican Revolution, Austin poses the
following question: "When did the revolted colony, which is now the Mexican Nation,
ascend from the condition of an insurgent province to that of an independent community?
... Or (adopting the current language about governments de jure and de facto) when did
the body of colonists, who affected sovereignty in Mexico, become sovereign in fact?"
AUSTIN, supra note 10, at 206. Austin's answer is that the sovereignty of the Mexican
Nation was established precisely when the obedience of the inhabitants of Mexico to that
body became so "frequent and lasting" that they were able to remain in a permanent"state of practical independence" from Spain. Id. But in what could such "practical
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If we put Austin's remarks about civil war together with what he has
to say about the concepts of power, habit, sovereignty, and law in
general, we arrive at the following definition of a legal system: A legal
system is a set of rules laid down for the guidance of human beings, by
a determinate person or group of persons having power over them by
virtue of their effective monopolization of the physical sanctions within
a particular jurisdiction (however defined).
Conclusion
Hart summarizes his long and detailed criticism of Austin's concept
of a legal system in the following way:
The root cause of failure is that the elements out of which the
theory was constructed, viz. the ideas of orders, obedience, habits,
and threats, do not include, and cannot by their combination yield,
the idea of a rule, without which we cannot hope to elucidate
even the most elementary forms of lawY
7
A "fresh start" is needed, Hart tells us, if we are to have a "better
account" of what a legal system is. 98 Hart's "better account" begins
with the idea of a rule. More particularly, it begins with the idea of
two distinct kinds of rules, which Hart terms primary and secondary.
Hart flatly asserts that in "the combination of these two types of rule
there lies what Austin wrongly claimed to have found in the notion of
coercive orders, namely, 'the key to the science of jurisprudence.' "9
We have already seen that Hart's analysis of primary and secondary
rules is not, by itself, sufficient to distinguish legal from other forms of
social control.100 The most convincing basis which Hart offers for
isolating the "distinctive structure of a municipal legal system" is to
be found in his brief account of the nature of legal sanctions. This is
the true center of Hart's concept of a legal system and far from rep-
resenting an "advance" or "fresh start" in jurisprudence, it merely
reproduces the analysis of legal sanctions offered by John Austin more
than a century before. It may be that Hart was so preoccupied with
independence" consist, if not in the Mexican government's effective monopoly over the
physical sanctions available for enforcing its laws within a specified territory? It may be
difficult, of course, to determine precisely when such a monopoly was achieved. Neverthe-
less, Austin's argument points to the conclusion that in principle it was "at that juncture
exactly", id., that the sovereign legal system of the Mexican Nation came into being.
97. HART 78.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 79.
100. See p. 589 supra.
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freeing English jurisprudence from what he regarded as a mistaken
conception of rules, that he simply failed to see how closely his overall
account of what a legal system is resembles the account of the philos-
opher that Hart made his principal polemical adversary in formulating
his own theory of rule-governed behavior. This failure dramatically
demonstrates the influence which a particular picture of law, in which
physical sanctions are given a preeminent place, continues to exercise
over the imagination of even the best legal philosophers.1°1
101. As further confirmation of this influence, it is interesting to note that Hart's
concept of a legal system turns upon a theory of sanctions remarkably similar to the one
advanced by Hans Kelsen. See H. KELSEN, THE PURE THEORY OF LAw 54 (M. Knight transl.
1967):
[A] definition of law, which does not determine law as a coercive order, must be re-
jected (1) because only by including the element of coercion into the definition of
law is the law clearly distinguished from any other social order; (2) because coercion
is a factor of great importance for the cognition of social relationships and highly
characteristic of the social orders called 'law'; and, (3), particularly, because by de-
fining law as a coercive order, a connection is accounted for that exists in the case
most important for the cognition of the law, the law of the modern state: the con-
nection between law and the state. The modern state is essentially a coercive order-
a centralized coercive order, limited in its territorial validity.
Kelsen also claims:
A difference between law and morals cannot be found in what the two social orders
command or prohibit, but only in how they command or prohibit a certain behavior.
The fundamental difference between law and morals is: law is a coercive order, that
is, a normative order that attempts to bring about a certain behavior by attaching to
the opposite behavior a socially organized coercive act; whereas morals is a social
order without such sanctions. The sanctions of the moral order are merely the ap-
proval of the norm-conforming and the disapproval of the norm-opposing behavior,
and no coercive acts are prescribed as sanctions.
Id. at 62. Kelsen defines "sanction" (much as John Austin did) as "the forcible infliction
of an evil," or "the forcible deprivation of a value." Id. at 108.
Hart recognizes Kelsen's similarity to Austin. HART 18. He fails, however, to see his own
similarity to both.
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